Lokpal’s jurisdiction over higher judiciary: what it means for complaints and due process safeguards

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Lokpal’s jurisdiction over higher judiciary: what it means for complaints and due process safeguards.

Table of Contents

An explainer on whether the Lokpal can entertain complaints against judges of the higher judiciary in 2025—and what that means for complainants, governments, and the judiciary’s due process safeguards. It distills the Supreme Court’s ongoing scrutiny of the Lokpal’s asserted jurisdiction over High Court judges, the statutory and constitutional architecture (Lokpal Act, Judges (Inquiry) Act, Veeraswami safeguards), and provides practical routes for stakeholders to frame or defend complaints while respecting judicial independence.

Where things stand in 2025

  • In January 2025, a seven‑member bench of the Lokpal held that judges of High Courts “established by an Act of Parliament” fall within Section 14(1)(f) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, and hence within Lokpal’s jurisdiction—distinguishing Supreme Court judges as outside scope because the Supreme Court is constituted by the Constitution (Article 124), not by statute. The Lokpal emphasized it was only deciding the jurisdictional point, not the merits of the complaint.
  • On 20 February 2025, the Supreme Court took suo motu cognisance, expressing deep concern and staying the Lokpal’s order; the case was then referred to a CJI‑led bench in April 2025 for authoritative determination. The top court flagged the implications for separation of powers and judicial independence.
  • Analyses highlight the tension between statutory anti‑corruption oversight and constitutional guarantees for the judiciary, including the special process under K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

Bottom line today: Lokpal’s jurisdiction over sitting High Court judges is under an express Supreme Court stay and is sub judice; any complaint route through the Lokpal against such judges is presently uncertain and likely paused by the stay.

Lokpal’s mandate (Section 14, Lokpal Act)

  • Covers the Prime Minister (with safeguards), Union Ministers, MPs, central public servants, and “any person who is or has been a director/employee/office‑bearer” in certain bodies “established by an Act of Parliament,” among other categories. Lokpal’s January order reasoned that judges of HCs established by statute (e.g., Delhi, Gauhati) are within “any person” tied to such bodies.
  • However, Lokpal’s own January 3, 2025 order (separate matter) held that Supreme Court judges are not covered because the SC is constituted by the Constitution, not an Act of Parliament, illustrating the interpretive fault line.

Judicial accountability pathways

  • Removal for “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” is governed by Articles 124(4), 217 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; this is the impeachment/removal track via Parliament.
  • Criminal law route per K. Veeraswami (1991): HC/SC judges are “public servants” under the Prevention of Corruption Act for corruption offences, but FIR/prosecution requires the President’s sanction after consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI); this Veeraswami safeguard protects against frivolous prosecution.
  • In‑house mechanism: Judicial inquiries under the “in‑house procedure” operate within the judiciary; critiques emphasize opacity but note its role in preserving independence while addressing conduct.

Constitutional tension

  • The Supreme Court has signalled that a statutory body like the Lokpal cannot trench upon the constitutional scheme for judicial independence and the specialized safeguards for investigating judges (e.g., CJI consultation).

What this means for complaints—practical pathways

Until the Supreme Court decides:

  • Complaints to Lokpal against sitting High Court judges are stayed; the Lokpal’s asserted jurisdiction is in suspense. Complainants should not expect Lokpal processing to proceed while the stay operates.
  • Alternative lawful routes remain: a detailed representation to the CJI under the in‑house procedure; or, for alleged corruption, a representation to the competent executive authority seeking Presidential sanction after CJI consultation as per Veeraswami (via MHA/Law Ministry), not a unilateral FIR.

For ex‑judges or non‑sitting judges:

  • If not shielded by current office, evaluate whether the person falls within any other Section 14 category (e.g., office‑bearer in a statutory body); still, constitutional sensitivities persist, and legal advice is crucial given the pending SC matter.

For complaints against Supreme Court judges:

  • Lokpal has already indicated lack of jurisdiction (Supreme Court not a “body” established by Act of Parliament); the in‑house/CJI and Veeraswami pathways are the lawful avenues.

Due process safeguards—what must be respected

  • Veeraswami filter: No FIR/investigation into a judge’s alleged corruption without Presidential sanction after mandatory CJI consultation; the purpose is to prevent harassment and preserve judicial independence. Any process bypassing this risks illegality.
  • Judges (Inquiry) Act: For removal‑grade misconduct, the 1968 Act’s motion and inquiry procedure via Parliament is the constitutional route; enforcement agencies must not conflate this with criminal process.
  • In‑house process integrity: Submissions to the CJI/Chief Justice of the High Court should be fact‑rich, precise, and avoid media trials; confidentiality protects both complainant and institution.

Stakeholder playbooks

Complainants (citizens, litigants, bar associations)

  • Evidence pack: certified orders, transcripts, case diaries, bank/material records where available, recusal/refusal patterns—organize chronologically with precise allegations tied to specific cases.
  • Route selection: For corruption allegations—seek Presidential sanction via executive with a request to consult the CJI (Veeraswami path). For ethical breaches/non‑criminal misconduct—file an in‑house complaint to the CJI/Chief Justice with annexures. Avoid filing with the Lokpal while the Supreme Court’s stay is in force.
  • Avoid defamation risk: Keep allegations strictly evidence‑based; avoid public dissemination that could prejudice proceedings.

Governments and vigilance agencies

  • Do not register FIRs against sitting higher‑judiciary judges without Presidential sanction/CJI consultation; build preliminary fact memos for seeking sanction rather than covert probes.
  • If a complaint is routed via Lokpal referral or otherwise, ensure channeling into the Veeraswami framework; maintain separation from impeachment/in‑house tracks.

Courts and registries

  • Fast‑track the Supreme Court reference: final clarity is institutionally valuable; until then, High Courts can rely on the Supreme Court’s stay and Veeraswami to decline attempts to proceed under the Lokpal route.
  • Strengthen in‑house processes with clearer communication to complainants on receipt and status while preserving confidentiality.

Media and civil society

  • Report with nuance: explain the distinct routes (Lokpal claim v. Veeraswami v. Judges (Inquiry) Act), the SC’s stay, and why judicial independence and accountability must be balanced.

Risk assessment: institutional and constitutional

If Lokpal jurisdiction over HC judges is ultimately upheld (hypothetical):

  • Parallel tracks: There would need to be harmonisation—e.g., mandatory CJI consultation before any Lokpal‑triggered probe; otherwise, the Veeraswami safeguard could be undermined.
  • Separation of powers friction: A statutory anti‑corruption body examining sitting judges raises executive–judiciary tensions; SC is likely to craft guardrails or limit scope.

If Lokpal jurisdiction is rejected:

  • Status quo ante: Complaints against higher judiciary continue solely via in‑house/Parliament (misbehaviour/incapacity) and Veeraswami (criminal corruption) routes; Lokpal remains out.

Templates and checklists

A) In‑house complaint (to CJI/CJ of HC) outline

  • Parties and capacity (bar association member/litigant); case identifiers; precise allegations with dates and proceedings; annexures (orders/transcripts/correspondence); relief sought (administrative inquiry, recusal guidance).

B) Veeraswami representation (seeking sanction)

  • Addressed to the competent executive authority; sets out prima facie materials indicating corruption offences; requests Presidential sanction after consultation with the CJI under Veeraswami; annexures and confidentiality request.

C) Government internal memo (sanction consideration)

  • Facts summary; legal thresholds; likely need for CJI consultation; draft reference to the President; risk and public interest assessment.

Checklist—Do’s

  • Keep allegations tightly tied to documents; preserve confidentiality; respect recusal norms; pursue lawful channels; await SC clarifications before Lokpal filings.

Checklist—Don’ts

  • Don’t bypass Veeraswami for criminal allegations; don’t run parallel media trials; don’t expect Lokpal processing of HC judge complaints while stay operates.

FAQs (2025)

  • Can Lokpal investigate sitting High Court judges today? No—its January 2025 assertion is stayed by the Supreme Court; matter is before a CJI‑led bench.
  • Are Supreme Court judges under Lokpal? Lokpal indicated no (SC is created by the Constitution, not statute); complaints follow in‑house or Veeraswami routes.
  • How can corruption allegations against judges be pursued lawfully? Via Presidential sanction after mandatory CJI consultation per K. Veeraswami, and then criminal process if sanctioned; for removal‑grade misconduct, via Judges (Inquiry) Act.
  • What happens next? Supreme Court will decide the Lokpal–judiciary question; commentaries suggest it will emphasise constitutional safeguards and likely cabin or reject Lokpal’s reach over sitting judges.

Outlook

The 2025 tussle over Lokpal’s jurisdiction has sharpened India’s longstanding balance between judicial accountability and independence. The Supreme Court’s stay and referral underscore that any accountability mechanism for higher judiciary must fit within constitutional architecture—principally Veeraswami and the Judges (Inquiry) Act—rather than expand a statutory ombudsman’s remit into the judicial domain without explicit constitutional design or robust safeguards. Stakeholders should route complaints through the established, lawful pathways and prepare for the Court’s final word, which will likely set granular guardrails for any future interface between anti‑corruption bodies and the higher judiciary.

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